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Abstract
Joint ventures, a particularly popular form of corporate cooperation, exhibit ownership pat-
terns that are clustered around equal shareholdings for a wide variety of parent ﬁrms. In this
paper, we investigate why 50-50 or “50 plus one share” equity allocations should be so preva-
lent. In our model, parent ﬁrms trade oﬀ control beneﬁts and costs with incentives for resource
contributions in the presence of asset complementarities. We show that strict resource comple-
mentarity eliminates moral hazard in parent contributions so that ownership provides suﬃcient
incentives for optimal investments. However, the potential for extraction of residual control
beneﬁts by the majority owner creates a discontinuity in contribution incentives at 50% equity
stakes that explains the optimal clustering of ownership around 50-50 shareholdings. Using
data from 1,248 US joint ventures announced between 1985 and 2000, we empirically analyze
the determinants of their ownership allocations and conduct tests of model predictions that oﬀer
strong support for our theory.1 Introduction
Hardly a day goes by without the announcement of a major strategic alliance between businesses.
Such corporate cooperation takes various forms, ranging from loose ad hoc understandings over
explicit contractual agreements to joint ventures. In all these arrangements, ﬁrms are willing to
grant each other access to some of their assets. This sharing of control over resources raises questions
of ownership, governance, and the appropriation of beneﬁts to better understand how ﬁrms assert
property rights over common assets and deﬁne their boundaries. In this paper, we focus on joint
ventures for which ownership and control arrangements are particularly well documented because
the partners incorporate their cooperation in an independent, jointly owned company.1
Joint ventures exhibit the following intriguing ownership pattern: the vast majority allocate
equal or almost equal equity stakes to the parent ﬁrms.2 Large-sample data (Table 1 in Appendix
C) indicate that about two thirds of two-parent joint ventures have 50-50 equity allocations, while up
to 12% show 50.1% or 51% majority stakes (“50 plus one share”). This clustering of shareholdings
is all the more surprising that typical determinants of ownership such as parent attributes or
incentives would seem to call for unequal share allocations, especially in such a large and diverse
cross-section of ﬁrms. Indeed, it has been argued that diﬀerences in resource costs (Belleﬂamme
and Bloch, 2000), private information (Darrough and Stoughton, 1989), or incentive requirements
(Chemla, Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001) all imply optimal asymmetric ownership structures. But
Table 2 underscores that even dissimilar parent ﬁrms show a preference for 50-50 shareholdings.
This economic puzzle is compounded by a legal one. The prevailing rules governing joint
ventures do not seem to favor equal shareholdings because disagreement between 50-50 owners
might result in permanent legal deadlock and, ultimately, signiﬁcant value losses. To explain the
observed equity patterns, we develop a simple model of ownership and control in joint ventures that
we then use to empirically analyze the determinants of ownership in two-parent US joint ventures.
In our model, two parent ﬁrms contribute noncontractible tangible or intangible resources such
1Corporate partnerships are very diﬀerent from private ones in which tradeoﬀs between risk sharing and incentives
are central (see, e.g., Lang and Gordon, 1995). By contrast, Johnson and Houston (2000) do not ﬁnd evidence for
risk sharing motives in joint ventures. Since ﬁrms can be taken to be risk-neutral by well-known arguments, other
issues such as moral hazard in joint production (see Holmstr¨ om, 1982) and the impact of control costs and beneﬁts
on ownership arrangements (see Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990) move to the forefront.
2The management literature has long recognized this puzzle: see, e.g., Bleeke and Ernst (1991).as physical assets or R&D eﬀort to a jointly owned, but independent corporate entity in an eﬀort
to exploit asset complementarities (“synergies”). Ownership not only provides incentives for re-
source contributions, but also confers private control beneﬁts, which are socially costly, on majority
shareholders. Since parent contributions are noncontractible, the parties face a trade-oﬀ between
investment incentives and control beneﬁts extraction. Hence, parents choose ownership allocations
that are optimal in light of their respective contributions and economic attributes so as to mitigate
the adverse consequences of control rights on investment incentives.
We ﬁrst establish that strong complementarities in parent resources, a commonly cited ratio-
nale for joint ventures, eliminate typical moral hazard in joint production, in which one venturer
attempts to free-ride on the other’s contribution (see Holmstr¨ om, 1982). Simple equity allocations
suﬃce to implement ﬁrst-best contribution incentives and, hence, joint venture value. These incen-
tive eﬀects might explain the popularity of joint ventures in the presence of strong synergies because
they are the only form of inter-ﬁrm cooperation that relies on explicit ownership stakes.3 The re-
sult is robust to introducing private control beneﬁts in the sense that strict asset complementarity
still does away with free-riding although control costs are otherwise responsible for second-best
outcomes.
Our main result shows that the three observed control regimes - joint control (50-50), 50 plus
one share, and outright majority control - coexist in equilibrium and can each be optimal for a
wide range of ﬁrms. In particular, we characterize optimal ownership arrangements in terms of
parents’ cost attributes and the net impact of control on value creation. It emerges that relatively
small social costs arising from the exercise of control rights suﬃce to make equal or almost equal
shareholdings optimal for quite heterogeneous parent ﬁrms, providing an explanation for the two
observed cluster points around 50-50 ownership.
The rationale behind the optimality of 50-50 shareholdings and joint control is that the potential
for value extraction by a dominant partner would hurt the minority ﬁrm’s contribution incentives
to a point where equal equity stakes maximize joint value creation. Only 50-50 ownership oﬀers
protection against rent seeking activities because each parent can resort to legal action and force a
stalemate in case the other ﬁrm attempts to extract residual beneﬁts.
3Fama and Jensen (1985) also argue that organizational form and investment decisions are interdependent because
of the implicit incentive eﬀects of the former for the latter.
2At the other cluster point, 50 plus one share, parents equally split return rights but allocate
control to the company with the more valuable resource. Partners trade oﬀ return with control
rights for the dominant parent who, otherwise, would underinvest because of insuﬃcient contri-
bution incentives. We also show that asset complementarities are the driving force behind such
ownership structures that disappear if parent contributions are substitutes.
Finally, if the partners are very dissimilar or the net impact of control minor, it is optimal
to grant outright majority ownership to the parent that makes the more valuable resource con-
tribution. In this situation, synergies and the positive incentive eﬀects of private beneﬁts for the
dominant shareholder outweigh the negative consequences of one-sided control in terms of contri-
bution disincentives for the minority partner.
We also provide an empirical perspective on our results by investigating the cross-sectional
determinants of joint venture ownership. In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the announcement eﬀect
of 1,248 US joint ventures formed between January 1985 and 2000, and ﬁnd that they generate
wealth gains for parent-ﬁrm shareholders averaging $30 to $60 millions that underscore the economic
signiﬁcance of joint ventures. Consistent with our model, the dominant partner in joint ventures
with one-sided control exhibits signiﬁcantly larger average wealth gains. Furthermore, joint ventures
with explicit buyout options that can mitigate incentive or contracting problems (see, e.g., Chemla,
Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001) generate signiﬁcantly higher abnormal returns for their parents.
To directly relate our theory to the empirical evidence, we next use parent wealth gains to recover
and estimate a model parameter that measures venturer similarity in terms of cost attributes and
determines ownership allocations together with the costs and beneﬁts of control. Although the latter
are typically unobservable, we attempt to capture their eﬀect through a proxy for the scope of value
diversion on the basis of parent and joint venture relatedness. The ﬁnal step is to estimate discrete
choice models of the three prevalent control regimes with these measures for parent similarity and
control beneﬁts as explanatory variables.
The results provide strong evidence in favor of our model predictions. Not only are our proxies
for parent similarity and value diversion statistically highly signiﬁcant, they also exhibit the exact
marginal eﬀects predicted by our analysis across the three ownership regimes. Parent ﬁrms are
more likely to adopt 50-50 ownership allocations when there is high potential for value diversion
3or when their resource costs are not too dissimilar. We also ﬁnd that leverage of the joint venture
increases the likelihood of adopting joint control, but decreases the likelihood of one-sided control.
Hence, one of our contributions is to shed some light on the empirical determinants of ownership
structures in joint ventures.
Our main contribution, however, is to formally show and empirically verify that relatively
small distortions in incentives arising from discontinuities in control rights suﬃce to explain the
optimal clustering of ownership in joint ventures around equal shareholdings. To our knowledge,
the observed prevalence of 50-50 and 50 plus one share equity allocations has not been formally
addressed, yet. Our paper attempts to ﬁll this void all the more that prior theoretical work has
mainly focused on asymmetric control and return rights in joint ventures, while empirical studies
have concentrated on their wealth eﬀects for parent shareholders.
In a setting of joint production with double-sided moral hazard similar to ours, Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine (1995) establish that linear sharing rules such as equity can induce optimal invest-
ments. However, the implied ownership arrangements are usually asymmetric. By adding costly
value diversion as in our model to this framework, Chemla, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) analyze
typical contractual provisions of joint ventures such as options and exit clauses to overcome the con-
sequences of incomplete contracts, but do not address the determinants of ownership and control.
Belleﬂamme and Bloch (2000) share our focus on parent attributes in terms of resource costs but
argue that asymmetries in the parent companies’ noncontractible contributions imply asymmetric
ownership arrangements. In a diﬀerent setting, Darrough and Stoughton (1989) analyze the eﬀect
of asymmetric sharing rules on ex post production levels and proﬁt allocations in a bargaining
framework under private information.
On the empirical side, McConnell and Nantell (1985) and Lummer and McConnell (1990) were
the ﬁrst to identify the value creation in joint ventures by documenting the positive abnormal
return reactions of parents’ stock prices to their announcement. Their ﬁndings were subsequently
conﬁrmed by Mohanram and Nanda (1998) and Johnson and Houston (2000) who analyze abnormal
return reactions in terms of horizontal and vertical joint ventures as compared to contractual
cooperation. However, these studies do not investigate the determinants of ownership structures in
joint ventures, which is central to our work.
4This paper is also related to the more general question of governance and incentives in strategic
alliances. Rey and Tirole (2001) show that the alignment or divergence of parent objectives and
governance issues determine the appropriate organizational form for strategic alliances including
joint ventures. Questions of ownership and control have also come to the forefront in the large
literature on international alliances where recent papers such as Desai, Hines and Foley (2001)
examine the optimality of international joint ventures and their ownership determinants.
The growing empirical literature on corporate cooperation documents many features of our an-
alytic framework. Elfenbein and Lerner (2001) report that the division of ownership and control
rights in internet portal alliances is consistent with predictions derived from incomplete contracts.
Similarly, Robinson and Stuart (2001) ﬁnd signiﬁcant empirical evidence for contractual incomplete-
ness in biotech strategic alliances and joint ventures that equity participations serve to overcome.
Allen and Phillips (2000) also highlight the importance of equity-based incentives by showing that
corporate share block purchases create signiﬁcantly higher abnormal returns in the presence of
strategic alliances including joint ventures. Regarding strategic alliances without equity compo-
nents, Chan, Kesinger, Keown and Martin (1997) ﬁnd announcement eﬀects that are consistent
with trade-oﬀs between synergies and control costs, as in our case.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 motivates our analysis in terms of empirical evidence
on joint venture ownership and the ambient legal environment. Section 3 presents a simple model of
joint venture formation and analyzes the consequences of asset complementarity. Optimal ownership
and control allocations are derived in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, we describe our data and
methodology, and summarize our empirical ﬁndings. The last section discusses our results and
concludes. All proofs and tables are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Ownership Patterns in Joint Ventures
To motivate our subsequent analysis, we ﬁrst provide some background evidence on ownership
patterns in joint ventures. Our data is drawn from the Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
database of Thomson Financial Securities Data and consists of two-parent joint ventures (about
80% of all recorded joint ventures) announced between 1985 and 2000 whose main activity lies in
5the US.4 Table 1 in Appendix C shows that about two thirds of joint ventures exhibit 50-50 equity
allocations: the parties equally share control and residual cash ﬂow rights. Another cluster point
arises at 50.1% or 51% majority stakes, which we will refer to as 50-plus because one party holds
50 plus one share, and group in one category (8%). While cash ﬂow rights are (almost) equally
distributed the capital structure allocates clear control to one party. Two further samples - US joint
ventures with at least one publicly quoted parent and a similarly selected sample of joint ventures
active in the European Union containing 12% 50-plus joint ventures - conﬁrm these ownership
patterns (see Table 1).
The prevalence of joint control (50-50) is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is unclear how parent
attributes such as resource costs, incentive requirements or information distribution would imply
symmetric shareholdings as the optimal arrangement for such a large and diverse cross-section
of joint ventures and partners. Indeed, the management literature and corporate announcements
emphasize complementarities between the parties’ tangible or intangible assets as the primary
reason for entering into a joint venture (see, e.g., Hennart, 1988 or Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). Such
a synergy rationale, however, suggests that the parents’ contributions and attributes are typically
heterogeneous and, hence, should not give rise to symmetric ownership stakes except for cases of
sheer coincidence. Furthermore, Table 2 illustrates that parent ﬁrms diﬀering in their attributes
still prefer 50-50 ownership and joint control by far over asymmetric equity arrangements.5
Second, the ambient legal rules that govern joint ventures in the US do not seem to favor
equal shareholdings. In 49 of the states, joint ventures fall under the Uniform Partnership Act
and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. “Disagreement among the partners” is resolved in all
jurisdictions by majority vote, strict in most. In such cases, the court will let the parties vote their
shares and decide according to the respective equity weights.6 Hence, disagreement in 50-50 joint
ventures becomes nearly intractable and might lead to permanent deadlock, all the more that it is
nearly impossible to specify a clear, complete and enforceable mechanism to break the impasse in
4The database deﬁnes a joint venture as “... a cooperative business activity, formed by two or more separate
organizations for strategic purpose(s), which creates an independent business entity, and allocates ownership, oper-
ational responsibilities, and ﬁnancial risks and rewards to each member, while preserving each member’s separate
identity/autonomy” (Thomson Financial Securities Data, our emphasis).
5Studying 668 worldwide alliances, Veugelers and Kesteloot (1996) also report that 50% of the joint ventures
between two asymmetric parents exhibit 50-50 share allocations.
6UPA x18(h); see also National Biscuit v. Stroud, 106 S.E.2d 692 (1959) which articulates the strict majority rule
in corporate partnerships such as joint ventures.
6all contingencies.
Since control rights are interpreted by US courts in the narrow equity share sense, the legal
environment seems to favor a clear allocation of control rights, not 50-50 shareholdings. However,
majority control is also fraught with problems as it might lead to abuses by the majority partner,
which are often hard to verify for an outside party such as a court. As a result, ﬁduciary duty
provisions extend only limited protection to the minority partner.7
3 Model Description and Joint Venture Optimality
In this section, we describe our model and establish the desirability of joint ventures as an organi-
zational form for strategic alliances in the presence of strict resource complementarities.
3.1 Model Description
In the attempt to exploit synergies, two risk-neutral ﬁrms A and B form a joint venture (JV
for short). This jointly owned corporate entity is an independent company with its own distinct
management and run at arm’s length from the parents. In the start-up phase, the venturers
contribute resources Ii;i = A;B to the common enterprise at non-veriﬁable cost ci(Ii) = ci
2 I2
i .
These contributions might take the form of tangible assets such as funds, plant or machinery
(“investments”), or intangible ones such as human, technology or marketing resources (“eﬀort”).
Since the joint venture’s raison d’ˆ etre are complementarities in assets and expertise, the partners’
inputs IA and IB are nonhomogeneous and, hence, diﬀer in value and cost parameters ci: Without
loss of generality, let A contribute the more valuable resource so that cA > cB: We think of
the ci parameters as capturing both the direct resource cost and indirect ones in terms of spill-
overs through, e.g., technological leakages, the threat of future competition by the joint venture or
partner, etc.
In the production phase, the joint venture creates terminal value V (IA;IB) from the parents’
resource contributions. We adopt the familiar Leontief speciﬁcation V (IA;IB) = minfIA;IBg for
the value creation process so that the contributed assets are truly complementary in the sense that
7See the decision in Meinhard v. Salmon, 154 N.E. 545 (1928).
7there is no scope for substitution in inputs.8 This choice is consistent with our focus on synergies
in joint venture design, which is also the most widely accepted rationale for their formation. We
analyze the consequences of perfect input substitutability, the other polar case, for joint venture
design in Appendix A.
An initial agreement speciﬁes the new entity’s capital structure. We take the parties’ contribu-
tions to be noncontractible in the sense that contractual provisions in their regard are diﬃcult to
verify or enforce.9 This assumption captures the often very specialized or intangible nature of the
contributions, whose quality or value might be hard to assess by the partner, let alone an outside
party such as a court of law. Hence, contracts can only be written on veriﬁable output, not con-
tributions such as physical assets or eﬀort Ii. As a result, the parties need to receive appropriate
incentives through their control and return rights which they implement through the joint venture’s
capital structure.
To round out our ﬁnancial design problem, we need to be speciﬁc about the distribution and
consequences of control. Following established American legal practices, we assume that 50%
ownership plus one share suﬃces for eﬀective control which, for joint ventures, is particularly
valuable because it confers private beneﬁts. The controlling parent is able to appropriate a fraction
± of the joint venture’s gross value V which we think of as residual control beneﬁts. They come
at the expense of diminishing the terminal value by a fraction d > ± through, e.g., the erosion of
synergy gains or competition by the dominant parent, so that the remainder of the company has
only a value of (1 ¡ d)V . The non-contractible nature of control rights prevents commitment not
to engage in such value diversion, or to share residual beneﬁts. In case of 50-50 ownership, neither
control costs nor beneﬁts accrue because the threat of legal action and ensuing stalemate suﬃces
to deter private beneﬁts extraction.
8The Leontief production function’s elasticity of substitution between the inputs is zero. The absence of uncertainty
about terminal value is without loss of generality because parent ﬁrms are risk-neutral.
9This assumption implies double-sided moral hazard in joint production as in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine
(1995). Elfenbein and Lerner (2001) or Robinson and Stuart (2001) provide empirical evidence consistent with
signiﬁcant contractual incompleteness including eﬀort provision in the context of corporate cooperation.
83.2 Optimality of All-Equity Joint Ventures
We ﬁrst establish the optimality of all-equity joint ventures as an organizational form for strategic
alliances when the partners’ contributions are strictly complementary. Consider the joint venture’s
ﬁrst-best value found by maximizing









with respect to parent contributions Ii. Enforcing the eﬃciency condition IA = IB to insure that











From the value maximizing resource contributions I¤
A = 1
cA+cB = I¤
B we obtain the ﬁrst-best net
value of the joint venture as W¤ = 1
2
1
cA+cB with output V ¤ = 1
cA+cB:
We next introduce ownership and, as a benchmark, derive the venturers’ resource contributions
in the absence of private control costs and beneﬁts, i.e., ± = d = 0. Let the equity stakes be ° for
parent A and 1 ¡ ° for parent B.
Lemma 1 Without private control costs and beneﬁts, incentive compatible parent contributions and















Proof. See the Appendix.
Optimal ownership implies that shareholdings are linear in the relative resource costs of the
parties. In principle, there is no reason to expect that the optimal equity stakes in equation
(2) lead to the ﬁrst-best value of the joint venture. Joint production typically suﬀers from an
externality problem between the partners, ﬁrst analyzed by Holmstr¨ om (1982). They face only











Figure 1: First-Best Incentives, Value and Ownership
limited individual incentives to provide resources because, at the margin, each parent recoups only
a fraction of the increase in the joint surplus that she actually contributes. In our case, however, the
strong complementarity embodied by the Leontief production function eliminates such free-riding.
Proposition 1 If parent resources are strict complements, optimal ownership stakes implement
ﬁrst-best investment incentives so that all-equity joint ventures attain ﬁrst-best value in the absence
of control costs and beneﬁts.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the preceding result and the intuition behind it. If inputs are pure comple-
ments the optimal joint output will show a much stronger reaction to a reduction in contributions
than to an increase which introduces an eﬃcient asymmetry in the incentive schedule Ii of each
party. If a parent were to reduce her contributions from the optimal level, her revenue would fall
correspondingly so that free-riding on the partner’s contribution becomes suboptimal. Hence, in the
absence of control costs or beneﬁts, return rights provide suﬃcient investment incentives to attain
ﬁrst-best outcomes. Note, however, that the resulting ownership structure is typically asymmetric
except for the case of identical parent cost attributes, i.e., cA = cB:
This rather strong result provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for the popularity (and optimality)
10of all-equity joint ventures as an organizational choice for strategic alliances. It shows that the
partners can use equity allocations - ownership - to decentralize ﬁrst-best value creation in joint
ventures with signiﬁcant synergy eﬀects. However, to capture these incentive beneﬁts, ﬁrms have to
resort to joint ventures as the only form of corporate cooperation with explicit equity stakes.10 We
would expect the requisite strong synergy eﬀects to primarily arise in vertical joint ventures. The
ﬁnding of Johnson and Houston (2000) that such joint ventures create signiﬁcantly more value for
parents than comparable contractual arrangements or horizontal joint ventures provides empirical
evidence in favor of Proposition 1. They also report that ﬁrms choose joint ventures over simple
contracts when noncontractibilities measured in terms of R&D expenditure (eﬀort) are more severe
which is again consistent with the implications of the preceding proposition.
As A’s ﬁrst-best share °¤ also provides an intuitive measure of relative resource cost, we retain it
for the subsequent analysis to gauge the degree of parent homogeneity. Notice that °¤ equals 1
2 for
resource costs cA = cB indicating that the venturers are homogeneous in their economic attributes;
the further away °¤ is from 1
2; the more dissimilar are the parents.
4 Ownership and Control
We now introduce control costs and beneﬁts so that a majority of shares confers a fraction ± of
private beneﬁts at a fractional cost d to the joint venture. Its net value WA to parent A as a
function of ownership becomes
WA =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
[± + °(1 ¡ d)]V (IA;IB) ¡ cA
I2
A
2 for ° > 1
2
° V (IA;IB) ¡ cA
I2
A
2 for ° = 1
2
°(1 ¡ d)V (IA;IB) ¡ cA
I2
A
2 for ° < 1
2
(3)
and similarly for parent B’s net value WB. The crucial idea in the above expression is the absence
of control beneﬁts and costs for 50-50 equity stakes. In the case of joint control, no parent can
extract residual control beneﬁts because the threat of a legal stalemate suﬃces to deter either party
from rent seeking activities.
10Proposition 1 also oﬀers a theoretical foundation based on incentives for the argument in Hart and Moore (1990)
that common asset ownership might be optimal in the presence of strict complementarities.
114.1 Majority Control
In theory, nothing precludes the parties from allocating control rights separately from return rights,
for instance, giving 49% of returns to A together with control and its beneﬁts. In practice, such
contracts could not possibly foresee all future contingencies so that the default provisions in the
Uniform Partnership Acts come into play and intertwine the two rights. As a consequence, an
increase in return rights beyond 50% leads to an increase in control rights so that parents cannot
eﬀectively separate the allocation of income and voting rights. We consider either control by parent
i or joint control (J) and, accordingly, index joint venture related quantities such equity stakes °k,
gross value (output) V k; and net value Wk by k = A;B;J.
Recall our cost convention that cA > cB: By the ﬁrst-best ownership allocation in equation (2),
parent A should hold the larger equity stake for optimal investment incentives. Since she would
get a fraction ± + °(1 ¡ d) of the joint venture’s value including her private beneﬁts, the value of
control to A is ± ¡ °d: Hence, control is valuable as long as




which we henceforth assume. Otherwise, the majority owner would not choose to extract control
rents because her loss as a shareholder °d would exceed her private beneﬁt ±.
Under control by A; maximizing the appropriate net total return in equation (3) for the par-
ents by choice of contribution Ii; i.e., maxIi WA
i ; i = A;B; yields the new incentive compatibility
conditions so that for ° ¸ 1
2 the venturers contribute at most
IA =
± + ° (1 ¡ d)
cA
; IB =
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ d)
cB
: (5)
The preceding expressions reveal that granting control to one party (A) hurts the investment
incentives of the other (B). The optimal distribution of return and control rights now depends on
which partner’s contribution determines, at the margin, the value of the joint venture.
We take each parent in turn and let ﬁrst A’s contribution constrain the JV’s value. In this case,
it is in both parties’ interest to adjust A’s stake ° so that investment incentives are equalized and
A has outright majority control.
12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Figure 2: Outright Majority Control with Asymmetric Return and Control Rights
Proposition 2 If ﬁrm A; contributing the more valuable resource, determines the joint venture’s
value at the margin, outright majority control by parent A is optimal with corresponding equity
stakes
°A = °¤ ¡
±
(1 ¡ d)
(1 ¡ °¤) and 1 ¡ °A =
1 ¡ d + ±
1 ¡ d
(1 ¡ °¤): (6)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The expression for optimal equity stakes in equation (6) shows that the presence of control rights
distorts the allocation of ownership and, hence, investment incentives. In their absence, we would
obtain ﬁrst-best resource contributions and shareholdings as in Lemma 1. Larger control beneﬁts or
costs reduce A’s stake but increase B’s. Put diﬀerently, the parties gross up B’s stake and decrease
A’s by the relative value of control to provide second-best eﬃcient contribution incentives. Figure 2
depicts how an asymmetric allocation of control and income rights determines joint venture value.
Under control by A; the net value of the stakes to parent i are WA
i = (1 ¡ d + ±)
2 W¤
i which is
simply their ﬁrst-best value adjusted for the net social cost of control d ¡ ±.
In the other case, control by ﬁrm A hurts B’s incentives to a point where the latter’s contribution
becomes the constraining factor in value creation. It is now impossible for the parties to ﬁne-tune
the distribution of return and control rights so that both ﬁrms face identical investment incentives.
13Raising B’s stake would decrease A’s below 50%, granting B control with the associated costs and
beneﬁts. But then, it is A’s contribution that would limit the joint venture’s value by the resource
cost convention cA > cB.
Hence, there exists a critical region around 50-50 shareholdings where it is impossible to equalize
investment incentives through the ownership structure. The following lemma characterizes this
region in terms of a threshold for relative resource costs °¤:




; where ¯ ° =
(1¡d)=2+±
1¡d+± ,
share allocations cannot equalize contribution incentives.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 implies that even small beneﬁts and costs associated with control rights might lead
to a large range of relative costs °¤ for which ownership stakes cannot equalize incentives.
4.2 The Choice of Control Regime
So far, we have only considered outright majority control by parent A. When °¤ as a measure of
parent homogeneity falls into the critical region, two further control regimes might become optimal:
joint control with 50-50 ownership, and 50-plus control (indexed by k = P) for which A holds 50
plus one share so that cash ﬂow rights are equally split but control is one-sided. Since granting
control to company B is never optimal by our cost convention cA > cB, it is suﬃcient to examine
the consequences of control by A.
Suppose that the relative resource cost parameter °¤ = cA
cA+cB falls into the critical region
deﬁned in Lemma 2, and consider the choice between 50-50 ownership and one-sided control by
A. In the latter case, it might be in the venturers’ interest to reduce A’s stake to provide better
contribution incentives to parent B: Since the joint venture’s output V is maximized at ° = 1
2, we
compare its net value Wk under joint control (50-50) with the corresponding values under outright
majority and 50-plus control to determine the optimal allocation of ownership.










ownership with joint control maximizes value creation in the joint venture.
14Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3 depicts the intuition behind Lemma 3. Equal equity stakes not only avoid the net social
cost of control d ¡ ±, but also the discontinuity in contribution incentives. Hence, minor frictions
stemming from control rights suﬃce to make joint control optimal. In particular, the preceding
lemma reveals that ﬁrms prefer 50-50 ownership if the net social costs of control are signiﬁcant
in comparison with relative resource costs °¤. If parents are very heterogeneous in terms of cost
attributes (°¤ > ˆ °) the need for incentives for the majority owner outweighs any eﬃciency losses.
It is easily veriﬁed that the 50-50 threshold ˆ ° increases in net social control costs.
The following proposition characterizes the diﬀerent second-best ownership arrangements in
joint ventures.





, 50-plus control for all °¤ 2 [˜ °; ¯ °); and outright majority control by A for °¤ ¸ ¯ °.





and outright majority control by A otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The thresholds ¯ ° and ˆ ° derived in Lemmata 2 and 3 are both functions of the net social cost
of control d¡±. When these costs are not too important, Proposition 3 shows that a third control
regime exists: 50-plus control combines equal return rights with control for the parent contributing
the more valuable resource (A): Figure 4 illustrates how 50-plus control optimally re-equilibrates
investment incentives when parents are mildly heterogeneous, i.e., for °¤ close to the outright
majority threshold ¯ °. When the costs associated with control rights are large, only two control
regimes exist because the overriding parent concern becomes either the large eﬃciency losses from
majority control or the need to equalize contribution incentives.
Figure 5 depicts our main results and their testable implications that follow from the fact that
optimal ownership arrangements vary with parent homogeneity °¤ and net control costs d ¡ ±.
From a cross-sectional perspective, a wide set of parameters can generate the observed ownership
15(1¡°)(1¡d)
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Figure 5: Ownership and Control
patterns. In particular, very diﬀerent, possibly industry-speciﬁc combinations of parent attributes
and net control costs give rise to the same optimal share allocation, which might account for the
optimal clustering of ownership around 50-50. The key insight is that control rights associated with
majority ownership lead to eﬃciency losses that equal shareholdings avoid.
The higher the net social cost of control, the more dissimilar the parties can be under 50-50
equity stakes in terms of cost attributes as in the case of the NUMMI 50-50 joint venture between
Toyota and General Motors. This implication also explains our ﬁnding that dissimilar parents are
as likely to form 50-50 joint ventures as their more homogenous peers (see Table 2 in Appendix C).
Conversely, smaller social control costs imply that asymmetric control right allocations become more
likely regardless of parent attributes so that 50-plus joint ventures are more frequent. As the parents
become more heterogeneous, the optimal return allocation changes from 50-50 to asymmetric cash
ﬂow rights and outright majority control.
The analysis of the linear production function case in Appendix A establishes that strict resource
complementarities are the underlying economic reason for the 50-plus regime. This arrangement
disappears in their absence or, as Figure 5 shows, with high social costs of control. We should
also point out that nothing in our speciﬁcation precludes control beneﬁts ± to outweigh costs d;
i.e., ± > d; so that one-sided control becomes socially desirable. In this situation, Lemma 3 and
Proposition 3 imply that 50-plus ownership completely displaces the 50-50 regime. We would
17expect this situation to arise in the presence of, for instance, beneﬁcial R&D spillovers or learning
of managerial techniques as exempliﬁed by the 51-49 joint ventures between Sanoﬁ S.A. and Sterling
Drug Inc. (pharmaceuticals) or Nikko Securities and Salomon Smith Barney (ﬁnancial services).
4.3 Managerial Agency Conﬂict
While 50-50 ownership and joint control can eliminate rent seeking activities through the threat of
legal action, this ownership arrangement might give rise to other costs. For instance, the joint ven-
ture might suﬀer from ineﬀectual decision making or lack of oversight. Should the parent ﬁrms be
unable to exercise eﬀective control, the joint venture’s management might be the inadvertent bene-
ﬁciary. To explore the role of self-interested managers, we now add the joint venture’s management
as an additional player and potential source of conﬂict to our model.11
Suppose that management can appropriate a fraction ¹ > 0 of the value created at a fractional
cost m > 0 to the joint venture: diverting ¹V (IA;IB) leaves (1 ¡ m)V (IA;IB) for distribution to
the parents. Such value diversion might take the form of shirking, negative NPV project selection,
etc. whose private value to managers is ¹V (IA;IB): We would expect this situation to occur
under joint control (50-50) for which the parent ﬁrms are busy monitoring each other instead of
management. If one partner had outright control (k = A;P); the threat to its private beneﬁts
should induce it to monitor or enforce managerial incentives. In this case, management colludes
in the diversion of a fraction ± of the JV value to the controlling party so that we are back in the
setting of Section 4.2.
Since control provides incentives for eﬀective monitoring, the previous characterization of the
control arrangements (Proposition 3) remains unchanged. However, the presence of managerial





in Lemma 2. We now derive the new joint control threshold ˆ °m in terms of parent homogeneity
°¤: 50-50 ownership and joint control in the face of managerial agency conﬂict is still preferable to
control by A if (1 ¡ m)2WJ > WA: Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 3, we obtain the new
threshold ˆ °m as
ˆ °m = (1 ¡ m)
(1 ¡ m) +
p
(1 ¡ m)2 ¡ (1 ¡ d + ±)2
2(1 ¡ d + ±)2
11For an analysis of the organizational choice of corporate cooperation in terms of the intensity of managerial
agency conﬂict and the partners’ monitoring capabilities, see Rey and Tirole (2001).
18so that parents choose joint control for all °¤ < ˆ °m:
We immediately see that managerial moral hazard reduces the range of relative resource costs
°¤ for which joint control is optimal: ˆ °m < ˆ °. If the new threshold falls into the critical region
(ˆ °m < ¯ °), which is now more likely, parents have more reason to choose 50-plus control. Super-
vising management creates more value than the adverse investment incentives of one-sided control
destroys. Note that the likelihood of 50-plus control increases in the cost of managerial agency
conﬂict (increase in m) and decreases in the net control costs d ¡ ± because of the governance
improvements it oﬀers.12 As agency costs m approach net control costs d ¡ ±, the threshold ˆ °m
converges to 1
2 and 50-plus control completely displaces 50-50 ownership and joint control.
5 Methodology and Data Description
In preparation for our cross-sectional analysis of ownership determinants, we next describe the data
set and methodology we use to relate our theoretical results to the empirical evidence.
5.1 Methodology
Joint venture partners trade oﬀ gains from resource complementarities with agency conﬂicts, in-
vestment incentives and control costs. From their shareholders’ perspective, parent ﬁrms should
only participate if the joint venture creates value net of resource and agency costs. If so, we would
expect their share prices to show a positive abnormal return reaction to the announcement of the
formation of one or more joint ventures. To verify such announcement eﬀects, we conduct an event
study following standard methodology.
We compute daily abnormal returns using a linear market model for the normal stock returns
that we estimate with a correction for non-synchronous trading eﬀects. For comparability between
US and non-US parents, we take the S&P 500 index as the US market portfolio and similarly widely
accepted foreign stock market indices. Our estimation window ranges from 280 to 50 days prior to
the joint venture announcement while the event window stretches from 20 days before to 20 days
after the announcement date.
12An implication of this result is that diﬀerences in the severity of managerial agency conﬂicts might explain the
much higher frequency of 50-plus control in European joint ventures (see Table 1).
19To relate theory to evidence, we use the cumulative abnormal wealth created by joint venture
announcements wi;i = A;B that, under the assumption of informationally eﬃcient markets, should
correspond to parent i’s expected payoﬀ Wi: We estimate parent wealth gains as
wi (¿1;¿2) = [ CARi (¿1;¿2) ¢ Ki¡21 (7)
where Ki¡21 and [ CARi (¿1;¿2) are ﬁrm i’s market capitalization on the eve of the event period
and its cumulative abnormal return over the event window ¿1 to ¿2, respectively.13
Recall that optimal ownership arrangements depend on the relative resource cost °¤ (see Figure
5) that can also be thought of as a measure of parent similarity. To establish a direct link between
our model predictions and cross-sectional evidence, we recover this unobservable cost parameter in
terms of observable parent wealth gains in equation (7) for a given control regime k:
Proposition 4 The relative cost parameter °¤ can be estimated in terms of observed cumulative
wealth gains wi (¿1;¿2) for control regimes k = A;J;P as b °¤ (k) where
k = A : b °¤ (A) =
wA (¿1;¿2)
wA (¿1;¿2) + wB (¿1;¿2)
k = J : b °¤ (J) =
wA (¿1;¿2)
3wA (¿1;¿2) ¡ wB (¿1;¿2)
(8)
k = P : b °¤ (P;z) =
(2 + z)wB (¿1;¿2) ¡ wA (¿1;¿2)





Furthermore, the relative size of observed wealth gains and ownership stakes identify parents as A
or B in each joint venture.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The second determinant of optimal ownership structures are the net social costs of control.
Although we cannot directly measure these largely unobservable costs, we develop the following
proxy. We ﬁrst classify parents and joint ventures in terms of their relatedness by two-digit Standard
Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes (related if they share the same two-digit code) and national
13Working with cumulative wealth instead of abnormal returns has the additional beneﬁts that we can easily
aggregate wealth eﬀects and avoid size related biases.
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Figure 6: Classiﬁcation Matrix for Joint Venture - Parents Relatedness
origin (headquarters in the same country) to gauge the scope for parent conﬂict and value diversion
(see Figure 6). Our measure of scope for value diversion is then a binary variable for joint ventures
of the type a ¡ a ¡ b (unrelated parents, one parent related to the JV). A parent from the same
industry or country (US) as the joint venture should be able to more easily extract private beneﬁts
because detecting and preventing such value diversion is presumably harder for its partner who,
coming from a diﬀerent industry or country, might not be as well versed in the “tricks of the trade.”
This proxy for residual beneﬁt extraction in terms of SIC code or national origin (denoted by
SICaab and NATaab; respectively), and the expressions for °¤ in equation (8) allow us to test
model predictions regarding ownership structure on the basis of estimates of parent attributes and
observed control regime.
5.2 Data Description
We start with our sample of US joint ventures announced between January 1985 and 2000 drawn
from the Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances database of Thomson Financial Securities Data. If
parents announce other joint ventures during the event window, we only include the ﬁrst one. For
joint ventures with at least one publicly traded parent we match venturers with stock price and
21other ﬁnancial information from the FactSet database family, whenever available. To improve the
data quality, we verify and correct these data points with information obtained by electronically
searching news wires around announcement dates. In case of conﬂicts, we delete the questionable
observations which leaves a total of 1,248 joint venture announcements with 1,545 parent companies.
Given our focus on two-parent joint ventures, we extract a further sample of joint ventures whose
parents are both publicly traded companies (297 joint ventures with 594 parent observations). We
also exclude 22 contaminated observations for which at least one parent had other news reported
in the three-day window around the announcement date in some of the analyses and report results
for the full and noncontaminated samples in case of signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Table 1 in Appendix C indicates that ownership patterns in our samples closely correspond to
the ones observed in the larger data sets: about two thirds of parents hold 50% equity stakes and
share control. From Table 3 we see that, on the basis of SIC codes, most joint ventures occur in
Transportation, Communications, Gas, Electricity, Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade, and Services.
Parent ﬁrm characteristics vary quite substantially (see Table 4). On average, parent ﬁrms tend
to be large in terms of market value ($7.18b), assets ($13b), sales ($11.7b) and number of employees
(96,189) which, in light of our focus on publicly traded companies, is hardly surprising. However,
a wide range of ﬁrms is represented: the largest parent counts 813,000 employees (GM in 1988),
the smallest one 34 (Cyanotech in 1994). Table 5 shows that the vast majority of venturers are
American companies (73%), followed by Japanese (14%), British and Canadian parent ﬁrms.
6 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we summarize our empirical ﬁndings and test model predictions.
6.1 Shareholdings and Wealth Creation
Table 6 in the Appendix provides mean daily and cumulative abnormal returns that highlight the
value created by joint venture announcements for their parents. About 53% of cumulative return
reactions are positive. Their means range from CAR(¡1;0) = 0:668% to CAR(¡2;2) = 0:672% in
the full sample, and are highly signiﬁcant (P values of below 0.0009). The results are even more
pronounced in the noncontaminated two-parent subsample that is presumably informationally more
22eﬃcient. Cumulative abnormal return means rise to CAR(¡1;0) = 0:957% and CAR(¡2;2) =
1:141% with P values of 0.0000. These abnormal returns translate into annualized returns of
62.5% (two-day window for the full sample) to 177.9% (ﬁve-day window for the non-contaminated
two-parent subsample).
Our ﬁndings are broadly in line with the results of earlier studies on the announcement eﬀect
of joint ventures. McConnell and Nantell (1985) report a mean cumulative abnormal return for
the two-day window from ¡1 to 0 of 0:73% while Johnson and Houston (2001) ﬁnd two-day mean
cumulative abnormal returns of 1.67%. Mohanram and Nanda (1998) report a mean cumulative
abnormal return of 0.49% for the three-day window ranging from ¡1 to 1.14
To see the economic signiﬁcance of our cumulative abnormal returns, consider the implied wealth
eﬀects. Table 7 shows that joint venture announcements create abnormal wealth gains that average
between $45 to $60 million in the two-parent sample. Our results also suggests that 50-50 joint
ventures create among the most wealth for their parents’ shareholders over the two-day window
from -1 to 0. Wealth creation generally increases in equity stakes so that, on average, the majority
owner experiences larger wealth gains than the minority one, which is consistent with our model
(Table 7: two-day window).
Figure 5 suggests a simple test of our model. Regardless of control costs or beneﬁts, the parent
homogeneity measure °¤ should be larger for joint ventures with outright majority control than
for 50-50 ones. From its estimate b °¤ (k) (see Proposition 4), we can easily construct a one-sided
test of this prediction. Table 8 reports the test results for various subsamples with diﬀerent outlier
corrections.15 Since the P value of the relevant test statistic is 0:0000 for all subsamples, we
decisively reject the null hypothesis that °¤ is invariant. Hence, we can conclude that partner
attributes in majority-controlled joint ventures are more heterogeneous than in 50-50 ones, as
predicted by our model. We also test the model prediction that °¤ (J) is close to 1
2, and ﬁnd that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis °¤ (J) = 1
2, which is, once again, consistent with our model
(see Table 8).
14Our results also correspond to the announcement eﬀects of other forms of corporate cooperation. In a study of
announcements reactions to non-equity strategic alliances, thus excluding joint ventures, Chan et al. (1996) ﬁnd an
average two-day cumulative abnormal return of 0:82%. Similarly, Johnson and Houston (2000) ﬁnd two-day average
cumulative returns of about 0.73% for announcements of contractual cooperation.
15Essentially, we control for joint ventures in which both parent wealth gains are very small (or diﬀerent in sign)
so that the relative cost measure b °
¤ (k) becomes very large and falls signiﬁcantly outside the required interval (0;1):
236.2 Determinants of Ownership Allocation
In light of our three distinct control regimes, it seems natural to specify a discrete choice model
of joint venture ownership. It is well known that such speciﬁcations arise from latent variables
which, in our case, is the value of the joint venture under an optimal ownership structure given
the parents’ attributes and the net social costs of control. Hence, we let the probability that joint
venture j adopts a particular control regime k = A;J;P be governed by
PrfREGIMEj = kg = Λ
Ã







where Λ is the logistic distribution function, b °¤ (k;z)j corresponds to our parent homogeneity
measure b °¤ (k) derived in Proposition 4, LEVj is a binary variable indicating leverage of the JV, and
RELxxxk
j a set of four binary SIC or nationality relatedness variables deﬁned by the classiﬁcation
scheme in Figure 6 (e.g., SICaaaj; SICacaj; SICaabj; SICacbj). Of particular importance are
the relatedness variables SICaabj and NATaabj that identify joint ventures with especially large
potential for value diversion.
We estimate the multinomial discrete choice model in equation (9) by full-information Max-
imum Likelihood. Since the likelihood of observing the 50-plus regime (k = P) also depends on
the parameter z; we conduct a grid search over z to maximize the log-likelihood function in the
subsequent estimation. We use our full two-parent sample but exclude 8 outliers.16
In light of our theoretical results as summarized by Figure 5 or Proposition 3, we would expect
that less homogeneous parents (high °¤) are less likely to adopt 50-50 ownership and joint control.
At the same time, they should be more likely to opt for one-sided control and, speciﬁcally, outright
majority ownership (k = A): Conversely, we should see that joint ventures with large value extrac-
tion potential (type a¡a¡b) are more likely to opt for 50-50 ownership and less frequently adopt
one-sided control. Hence, we can test our central model predictions in terms of the marginal eﬀect
of b °¤ (z)j on the likelihood of the three ownership regimes: negative for joint control, positive for
50-plus, positive and larger for outright majority control. The corresponding empirical implications
for our control cost proxies SICaabj or NATaabj require that their marginal eﬀects be positive
16For these observations, wealth eﬀects are so close to 0 that b °
¤ (k;z) falls outside the interval (¡5;5). Since the
estimation results are virtually identical for the noncontaminated sample we do not report them.
24for 50-50 joint ventures and negative for those with 50-plus or outright majority control.
Both speciﬁcations reported in Table 9 show that the b °¤ (k;z) coeﬃcients come out highly
signiﬁcant. More importantly, the marginal eﬀects of the parent homogeneity measure b °¤ (k) cor-
respond exactly to our model predictions. The highly signiﬁcant negative marginal eﬀect of b °¤ (z)j
in the joint control equation means that the likelihood of observing 50-50 ownership decreases in
°¤; i.e., more heterogeneous parents are less likely to choose joint control. At the same time, the
equally signiﬁcant positive marginal eﬀects of b °¤ (k;z) in the 50-plus and outright majority regime
equation indicate that more dissimilar parents are more likely to adopt one-sided control.
We also ﬁnd that SICaabj as a proxy for control eﬀects exhibits the predicted marginal eﬀects
on ownership choice. Joint ventures with a large potential for value diversion are more likely to
have 50-50 shareholdings and joint control, while 50-plus and outright majority control become less
likely. This ﬁnding is all the more important that SICaabj is the only relatedness dummy that
is statistically signiﬁcant across all three ownership regimes. Finally, its coeﬃcient has the largest
marginal eﬀect in absolute terms in both the equation for 50-50 and outright majority control
among the relatedness variables. The results in terms of national origin conﬁrm these control right
eﬀects. We interpret our ﬁndings on the marginal eﬀects of parent homogeneity and relatedness as
strong evidence in favor of our model.
Our model also implies that the larger the potential for value extraction, the more heterogeneous
the parents will be under 50-50 ownership. After adding the interactive variable b °¤ (k;z)j¢SICaabj
to the speciﬁcation in equation (9), we obtain estimates of marginal eﬀects that are consistent with
this prediction (Table 10). For joint ventures susceptible to value diversion (SICaabj = 1), parent
heterogeneity (b °¤ (k;z)) leads to a signiﬁcantly smaller reduction in the likelihood of adopting 50-
50 ownership. Hence, parents in 50-50 joint ventures with large potential control beneﬁts tend to
be more dissimilar. Furthermore, we see that the likelihood of observing 50-plus ownership for
heterogeneous parents falls when there is considerable scope for value diversion.
Our results reveal a further interesting marginal eﬀect related to the leverage of joint ventures
(about 35% of our two-parent observations). We ﬁnd that the presence of debt increases the
likelihood of adopting 50-50 ownership but decreases it for 50-plus and majority controlled joint
ventures (Tables 9 and 10). US GAAP might oﬀer an explanation for this ﬁnding. Parents holding
25majority stakes have to fully consolidate the joint venture and recognize its liability on their balance
sheets in case they guarantee the debt. Unfortunately, our data does not distinguish between
guaranteed and nonguaranteed debt so that we cannot further analyze debt-related eﬀects.
6.3 Wealth Eﬀects of Contingent Ownership
It is well known that pure equity arrangements will rarely induce eﬃcient investment between part-
ners in the presence of costly private control beneﬁts.17 However, there are special circumstances
in which contingent ownership arrangements can overcome this problem. For instance, N¨ oldeke
and Schmidt (1998) and Chemla, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) have suggested the use of sell-out or
buy-out options when the parent contributions diﬀer in time or observability. Options can internal-
ize the consequences of control by the dominant party without destroying the partner’s investment
incentives if, at the time of exercise, the continued investment of one parent is no longer needed.
Explicit provisions for buyout or sellout options are not only evidence of the importance of
contractual incompleteness, but also signal that the partners are able to deﬁne its nature and
duration. Indeed, our sample shows both buyout activity (3.77% and 4.71% for the full and two-
parent samples, respectively) and the presence of explicit options to buy out the partner (2.88%
and 4.38% for the full and two-parent samples, respectively). Bleeke and Ernst (1991) also report
that partners tend to buy out each other. Using our data, we test whether contingent ownership
of joint ventures implemented through options improves welfare and is, hence, socially desirable.
Analyzing a subsample of 36 US joint ventures with reported buyout options we ﬁnd mean cumu-
lative abnormal returns that are substantially higher than for our full US joint venture samples (see
Table 11). They range from means of CAR(¡1;0) = 1:033% to CAR(¡5;5) = 3:696% as compared
to the earlier reported abnormal return means of CAR(¡1;0) = 0:668% or CAR(¡5;5) = 0:908%
for all joint ventures with at least one publicly traded parent (Table 6).
To verify that these surprisingly strong return reactions are not an artifact of our relatively small
sample, we also report the results for a sample of 187 parent ﬁrms of worldwide joint ventures with
buyout option provisions (including our US sample) in the Thomson Financial Securities Data
database. It emerges that worldwide mean cumulative abnormal returns are very comparable
17See Grossman and Hart (1986).
26averaging between 1:896% and 2:947% over 2 and 11 day windows, respectively. They are also
statistically highly signiﬁcant which is unsurprising in light of the larger sample size. On an
annualized basis, these numbers translate into abnormal returns ranging from 162% to 2,980%.
Hence, the market seems to recognize the positive eﬀects of options in terms of their incentive
beneﬁts, their role in overcoming contractual incompleteness, and their ability to constrain rent
seeking behavior by the parent companies.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a simple theory of ownership and control in joint ventures and provides empir-
ical evidence on their determinants. In designing optimal equity allocations, parent ﬁrms trade oﬀ
incentives arising from ownership with disincentives stemming from the extraction of control bene-
ﬁts in the presence of synergies. This trade-oﬀ echoes long-standing ideas going back to Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1985) that the need for appropriate incentives determines a
ﬁrm’s capital structure and, indeed, organizational form. We ﬁnd that the same principles guiding
organizational and ﬁnancial design within the ﬁrm also apply across ﬁrms.
According to well-known views of the ﬁrm, companies deﬁne their boundaries by the need to
assert property rights over assets (see Grossman and Hart, 1986, or Baker, Gibbons and Murphy,
2001). However, the underlying idea of exclusive ownership of and control over resources proves to
be elusive when more than just one ﬁrm requires incentives (see Zingales, 2000). We show how the
need for two-sided incentives shapes the organization of inter-ﬁrm cooperation so as to overcome
problems of moral hazard in joint production at a ﬁrm’s periphery. When ﬁrms’ resources are
highly complementary, ownership alone suﬃces to induce ﬁrst-best incentives and, hence, value
creation by eliminating typical free-riding in joint production. But only joint ventures oﬀer the
incentive beneﬁts of explicit ownership which might explain their popularity as an organizational
choice for strategic alliances.
However, common ownership also implies shared control over assets with all the costs and bene-
ﬁts that compromises on the exclusive use of resources typically entail. In the case of joint ventures,
we argue that the more important concerns about control rights become, the more frequently will
parent ﬁrms adopt 50-50 ownership. The underlying rationale is that residual beneﬁts derived
27from control rights can lead to distortions in parent incentives that equal ownership stakes avoid.
Our central result shows that very diﬀerent, possibly industry- or ﬁrm-speciﬁc combinations of
parent attributes and costs associated with unilateral control can lead to the optimal clustering of
ownership at 50-50 and 50 plus one share equity allocations.
We empirically verify this insight by analyzing the determinants of joint venture ownership.
The results identify proxies for parent similarity in terms of resource costs and for the potential
of value extraction by a controlling ﬁrm as the driving forces behind the choice of control regime.
Furthermore, their marginal eﬀects conform precisely to our theoretical predictions. In the pres-
ence of relatively minor control costs, even very heterogeneous parents will optimally choose equal
ownership stakes. We interpret these ﬁndings as strong empirical support for our model and, in
particular, our contention that small frictions arising from the one-sided nature of control suﬃce
to generate the observed ownership patterns.
Our results also identify avenues for future research. For instance, one can use our framework
to structurally estimate the value of control rights taking into account that ﬁrms design their
cooperation to minimize potential losses from ineﬃcient ownership arrangements. With information
on the parents’ contributions, their cost, or the joint venture’s asset value, we could derive expected
wealth gains directly from the data and the relevant model parameters. A comparison with realized
abnormal wealth eﬀects would then yield a measure of the eﬃciency losses due to control rights.
Furthermore, our ﬁndings on contingent ownership arrangements and the role of debt in joint
venture ﬁnance, while exploratory in nature, suggest that other instruments besides equity play
a role in their ﬁnancial and organizational design. However, such an analysis would require a
dynamic model of joint venture design, pointing to several possible extensions of our framework to
investigate the inter-temporal aspects of corporate cooperation.
28Appendix
A Linear Production Function
To show that our main results do not depend on strict resource complementarities or a particular
production function, we replicate the analysis for the linear production function (perfect input
substitutability) which is the polar opposite to the Leontief speciﬁcation within the CES class of
production functions.18
We ﬁrst investigate moral hazard in joint production. Consider our familiar value maximization




B with V (IA;IB) = aAIA + aBIB in the absence of
control costs or beneﬁts d = 0 = ±. Replicating the analysis in Section 3.2, we obtain ﬁrst-best
parent contributions as I¤
i = ai
ci: Introducing ownership ° the incentive compatibility conditions
for the parents become Ii = °i
ai













Comparing the optimal private investment levels to the socially optimal ones we immediately see




i since 0 < °¤
i < 1. Both parents will underinvest relative to the ﬁrst best
so that the familiar free-riding problem in joint production arises when resources are substitutes.19
Now suppose, as before, that the majority owner can extract fractional beneﬁts ± at a social
cost of d > ± for ° > 1
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cB with °¤ > 1
2: Joint control is
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Such a region exists for a wide range of parameters, notably if parent contributions
a2
i
ci are similar in
total value, because majority control entails deadweight loss (shirking, contribution disincentives).
Hence, we obtain our familiar joint (50-50) and outright majority control regimes.
Contrary to the Leontief technology, 50-plus control does not exist under perfect resource sub-
stitutability (linear production). This regime could only exist if two conditions were to hold: ﬁrst,
we require WJ < WA(1

























(1 ¡ d + ±); (10)
second, it must be true that outright majority ownership does not increase joint surplus further






½ assumes the familiar
Leontief form f (IA;IB) = minfIA;IBg as ½ ! ¡1 so that the constant elasticity of input substitution ¾ =
1
½¡1 ! 0.
For a0 = 0 and ½ # 1 the CES function becomes linear and the elasticity of substitution ¾ =
1
½¡1 ! 1:
19In fact, underinvestment will take place for any production function with input substitutability, e.g., Cobb-
Douglas in the CES class, but not for those with strict input complemenarity such as the Leontief speciﬁcation.
29under one-sided control, i.e.,
dWA(°)


































cB , establishing the contradiction.
The intuition behind this result is that 50-plus control can only arise if a further increase in the
shareholdings of the controlling parent A would reduce value creation because the minority partner
becomes the critical resource constraint. But if the ﬁrms’ contributions are strongly substitutable,
such a resource constraint will not exist. We interpret this last result as a further indication for the
importance of resource complementarities (synergies) in the inception and design of joint ventures.
Not only do they reduce deadweight losses from free-riding in joint production, they also justify
the empirical observation of a cluster point at 50-plus ownership. Our ﬁndings also hint at the
choice of organizational form for strategic alliances. The more complementary resources are, the
more frequently should partners choose joint ventures.
B Proofs
Let °k
i ;k = A;J;P denote i’s ownership stake under outright majority (A), joint, and 50-plus
control, respectively (°k
A + °k
B = 1), Wk the joint venture’s surplus, and Wk
i i’s net JV proﬁts.
Proof of Lemma 1. Given their shares, the parties will contribute investments IA and IB to the
joint venture that maximize their net returns VA = °V (IA;IB)¡ cA
2 I2
A and VB = (1¡°)V (IA;IB)¡
cB
2 I2








To ﬁnd the optimal shareholdings, we maximize the joint venture’s value with respect to ° subject









subject to IA =
°
cA and IB =
1¡°
cB



























At an optimum, resources will be used eﬃciently, i.e. the partners’ incentive compatible contribu-












Proof of Proposition 1. The result is a consequence of Lemma 1. Given optimal ownership stakes
°¤ = cA







B so that the partners’ contribute ﬁrst-best resource levels. The JV’s net equilibrium
value becomes W (°¤) = 1
2
1
cA+cB; which is exactly the ﬁrst best value of the ﬁrm, W¤. Since the
net value of the parents’ respective stakes are Wi (°¤) = 1
2
ci
(cA+cB)2 > 0; this solution satisﬁes the
participation constraints, too.
Proof of Proposition 2. The JV’s output V A under control by A follows from the joint production
function as
V A (°) = min
½
± + °(1 ¡ d)
cA
;














Choosing A’s stake so that investment incentives are equalized, i.e.,
± + °(1 ¡ d)
cA
=
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ d)
cB
;
and solving for ° yields the (second-best) optimal ownership distribution under control by A :
°A =
(1¡d)cA¡±cB
(1¡d)(cB+cA) = °¤ ¡ ±
(1¡d)(1 ¡ °¤):
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that °¤ is suﬃciently close to 1
2 so that granting control to A would
constrain the JV output to
V A (°) = min
½
± + °(1 ¡ d)
cA
;









: Control by A under cA > cB is optimal as long as there exists ° ¸ 1
2 such that













Simple algebraic manipulation using °¤ = cA
cA+cB now yields the critical threshold ¯ ° =
(1¡d)=2+±
1¡d+±
so that for °¤ > ¯ ° optimal asymmetric equity stakes °A (see Proposition 2) are feasible while for
1
2 < °¤ < ¯ ° equation (12) is violated and B indeed contributes less.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let °0 denote the equity allocation that would equalize investment incentives




cB for °0 2 (0;1).




the JV’s surplus under 50-plus ownership. Consequently, WA(°0) deﬁnes an upper bound for net
joint venture surplus under any equity allocation diﬀerent from joint ownership. Hence, we have to




2(1¡d+±)2 to prove the lemma.
Consider the JV’s net values for ° = 1
2 and ° = °0. Since ° = 1
2 implies joint control and parent




















cB . Solving out for
31°0 =
(1¡d)cA¡±cB
(1¡d)(cA+cB); we ﬁnd WA (°0) as
WA ¡
°0¢
= (1 ¡ d + ±)
°0(1 ¡ d) + ±
2cA
=
(1 ¡ d + ±)2
2(cA + cB)
: (14)












°¤ ¸ (1 + ± ¡ d)2°¤
or, equivalently, (1 ¡ d + ±)2 (°¤)
2 ¡ °¤ + 1
4 · 0. Hence, ˆ ° is the root larger than 1
2 of








1 ¡ (1 ¡ d + ±)2
2(1 ¡ d + ±)2 :
By construction, we have WJ > WA(°0) for °¤ < ˆ ° and WJ · WA(°0) otherwise, establishing the
result.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since the relative size of thresholds ˆ ° and ¯ ° determines the number of
ownership regimes we take each case in turn.
Two regimes: ˆ ° ¸ ¯ °: By Lemma 3, parents prefer joint control for all °¤ · ˆ °; in the case of
°¤ > ˆ ° outright majority control is feasible (by Lemma 2 since °¤ > ¯ °) and optimal (Lemma 3).
Three regimes: ˆ ° < ¯ °: Lemma 3 establishes that, for all °¤ > ¯ °, outright majority control is
optimal while 50-50 ownership is preferable for °¤ < ˆ °. In the remaining interval [ˆ °; ¯ °]; only 50-50




= (1 ¡ d)










rearranging. Clearly, G(°¤) is continuously diﬀerentiable on [ˆ °; ¯ °]: Furthermore, we have G(ˆ °) < 1,
since, by Lemma 3, WJ = WA(°0) > WP if °¤ = ˆ °; and, similarly, G(¯ °) > 1 because Lemma 2
implies WP = WA(°00) > WJ if °¤ = ¯ ° for some °0 and °00 equalizing incentives if A had control
regardless of her equity stake equation (see Lemma 3). By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there
exists at least one value ˜ ° 2 (ˆ °; ¯ °) so that G(˜ °) = 1 or, equivalently, WP (˜ °) = WJ (˜ °), which,
if unique, is our desired threshold for 50-plus control. Hence, to complete the proof, we have to
establish the uniqueness of ˜ ° by showing that dG
d°¤ > 0 on [ˆ °; ¯ °]:
Diﬀerentiating (15) we obtain
dG
d°¤ = 2(1 ¡ d)°¤12°¤ (1 ¡ d)(1 ¡ °¤) + 2± (5°¤ ¡ 2)(1 ¡ °¤) ¡ 3(1 ¡ d)
(4°¤ ¡ 1)













= 4(1 ¡ d + 2±)±
(1¡d+±)2
(1¡d+3±)2 > 0 by condition (4),
32i.e., ± > 1






which are simply the roots of the numerator in equation (16). It is easily veriﬁed that °¤
1 < 1
2 <
¯ ° < °¤
2 so that °¤
1 must be a minimum, °¤
2 a maximum and, hence, dG
d°¤ > 0 on [ˆ °; ¯ °] establishing
the uniqueness of the threshold ˜ °:
Proof of Proposition 4. Under control by A; the net value of i’s equity stake is WA
i =
(1 + ± ¡ d)
2 W¤
i for ﬁrst-best JV value W¤
i = 1
2°¤




















. If markets are informationally eﬃcient we can replace WA
i with wi (¿1;¿2) in the expres-
sion while preserving the asymptotic distributional properties. Repeating the preceding argument

























so that replacing WJ
i with wi (¿1;¿2)
again yields the desired result.





























which depends on the social cost term 4±
1¡d: Hence, we will parameterize our model to derive a
closed form solution independent of the unobservable control costs and beneﬁts. Let 4±
1¡d = z for
some parameter z > 0 so that ± = 1¡d















which is greater than 1
2 for (1 + z)WP
B > WP
A : We need to verify that the parameter restrictions for
±;d and ˆ ° < ¯ ° hold for some value of z. One condition that insures the existence of three control
regimes is d = 21
20±;± > 1
8 while privately valuable control requires ± > °d;° ¸ 1
2: However, it is easily
veriﬁed that ± = 20 z
80+21z;d = 21 z
80+21z satisfy not only the three regimes and parameterization
conditions but also the restriction for privately valuable control. Note that an estimate of z allows
us to infer relative costs of control in the 50-plus regime as ±
1¡d = z
4:
The last part of the proposition is a simple consequence of the preceding expressions for parents’
wealth gains from the joint venture. For outright control, we have WA
A = (1 + ± ¡ d)
2 1
2°¤V ¤ >
(1 + ± ¡ d)
2 1
2 (1 ¡ °¤)V ¤ = WA
B by °¤ > 1











B by cA > cB; respectively. Replacing model quantities with
observed ones again yields the desired result.
33C Tables
Table 1: Ownership Distribution in Two-Parent Joint Ventures
“1 Public Firm” and “2 Public Firms” refer to two-parent joint ventures with at least one or two publicly
traded parents, respectively, while “EU” indicates a comparator sample of two-parent European JVs.
Majority Stake All US JVs 1 Public Firm: US 2 Public Firms: US 1 Public Firm: EU
(in %) Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
50-50 1,931 71.04 1,296 67.78 193 64.98 1,257 62.72
50+ to 51 210 7.73 154 8.05 27 9.09 245 12.23
51+ to 60 192 7.06 150 7.85 30 10.10 151 7.53
60+ to 67 60 2.21 47 2.46 8 2.69 63 3.14
67+ to 75 135 4.90 106 5.54 17 5.72 160 7.98
75+ to 80 100 3.68 80 4.18 9 3.03 56 2.79
80+ to 90 57 2.10 43 2.25 9 3.03 33 1.65
90+ to 100 33 1.21 36 1.88 4 1.35 39 1.95
Total 2,718 100.00 1,912 100.00 294 100.00 2,004 100.00
Table 2: Two-Parent Joint Venture Ownership Structure by Venturer Similarity
We classify joint venture parents as similar (“Sim.”) if they belong to the same two-digit SIC code, are from
the same country, or fall within 30% of the average of their market value, total sales or number of employees,
and dissimilar (“Dissim.”) otherwise.
Parent Attribute Two-digit SIC National Origin Market Value Total Sales Employees
Sim. Dissim. Sim. Dissim. Sim. Dissim. Sim. Dissim. Sim. Dissim.
Joint ventures 45.1% 54.9% 44.4% 55.6% 29.2% 70.8% 30.0% 70.0% 13.9% 86.1%
of which:
50-50 62.7% 66.9% 68.9% 61.8% 77.0% 59.8% 72.4% 61.6% 65.5% 65.4%
50-plus 7.5% 11.0% 6.8% 11.5% 5.4% 11.2% 5.3% 11.3% 3.4% 10.1%
Outright majority 29.9% 22.1% 24.2% 26.7% 17.6% 29.1% 22.4% 27.1% 31.0% 24.6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 3: Industry Distribution of US Joint Venture Parents
SIC Code Description At least One Public Parent Two Public Parents
1 digit Number Frequency Number Frequency
4xxx Transp., Comm., Gas, Elect. 484 31.33% 232 39.06%
3xxx Manufacturing 269 17.41% 122 20.54%
5xxx Wholesale Trade 198 12.82% 66 11.11%
8xxx Services 173 11.20% 62 10.44%
7xxx Finance, Insurance, Real E. 119 7.70% 24 4.04%
2xxx Construction 108 6.99% 30 5.05%
6xxx Retail Trade 72 4.66% 18 3.03%
1xxx Mining 65 4.21% 22 3.70%
Others 57 3.69% 18 3.03%
Total 1,545 100.00% 594 100.00%
34Table 4: Parent Attributes in Two-Parent Sample: Averages by Stake
Equity Stake Market Assets Sales Op. Cash Employees Inside Owner-
(in %) Value (in m) (in m) (in m) Flow (in m) ship (in %)
0 to 20 6925.82 9325.23 11171.03 607.17 120784 13.06
20+ to 40 12034.38 20323.68 25112.38 1069.50 52257 18.93
40+ to 49- 4010.84 8970.65 8757.35 807.46 90717 8.07
49 to 50- 3479.06 17711.28 13971.93 427.59 29147 30.85
50-50 7081.46 12452.68 10449.81 706.42 103971 13.20
50+ to 51 6111.11 14717.78 9480.42 543.38 98693 12.31
51+ to 60- 3497.04 2417.33 2504.05 243.11 23138 2.84
60 to 80- 6427.70 12055.28 10007.32 565.41 105201 12.52
80 to 100 6579.89 8859.21 10612.49 576.79 120784 13.06
Average all 7164.91 13065.11 11723.26 695.06 96189 14.29
Maximum all 68741.87 194881.00 192548.50 9627.00 813000 82.26
Minimum all 1.00 4.67 0.00 -1303.55 34.0 0.025
Table 5: Country Origin of Parents by Headquarter Location
Country At least One Public Parent Two Public Parents
Number Frequency Number Frequency
US 1,124 72.75% 403 67.85%
Japan 214 13.85% 106 17.85%
UK 45 2.91% 14 2.36%
Canada 44 2.85% 11 1.85%
Germany 26 1.68% 18 3.03%
France 19 1.23% 7 1.18%
Australia 12 0.78% 6 1.01%
Others 61 3.95% 29 4.88%
Total 1,545 100.00% 594 100.00%
Table 6: Mean Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Returns






AR;CAR Returns P value Returns P value Returns P value
AR¡2 0:119% 0.1915 0.163% 0.1523 0.167% 0.1606
AR¡1 0:208%¤¤ 0.0221 0.237%¤¤ 0.0380 0.318%¤¤¤ 0.0076
AR0 0:460%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000 0.438%¤¤¤¤ 0.0001 0.542%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000
AR1 0:010% 0.9090 0.075% 0.5103 0.081% 0.4961
AR2 ¡0:125% 0.1683 0.039% 0.7335 0.032% 0.7876
CAR(¡1;0) 0:668%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000 0.675%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000 0.860%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000
CAR(¡1;1) 0:678%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000 0.750%¤¤¤¤ 0.0002 0.941%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000
CAR(¡2;2) 0:672%¤¤¤¤ 0.0009 0.952%¤¤¤¤ 0.0002 1.141%¤¤¤¤ 0.0000
CAR(¡5;5) 0:908%¤¤¤ 0.0026 0.748%¤ 0.0532 0.671%¤ 0.0968
CAR(¡1;0) > 0 53.20% of observations 53.53% of observations 54.36% of observations
Observations 1;545 594 550
Signiﬁcance level:
¤¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 0.1%,
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1%,
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5%,
¤ signiﬁcant at 10%.
35Table 7: Mean Cumulative Wealth Eﬀects (USD millions)
Two Public Parents by Stake: Noncontaminated Sample
Equity Stake in % Obs. w(¡1;0) w(¡1;1) w(¡2;2) w(¡5;5)
0 to 20 19 -9.05 -165.25 -27.25 -72.70
20+ to 40 47 11.82 21.45 166.35 -190.50
40+ to 49- 6 596.18 1377.43¤¤¤ 1240.11¤¤ 919.39
49 to 50- 24 33.54¤¤ 32.92 30.63 -1.77
50-50 358 62.44¤¤ 43.08 38.01 -14.77
50+ to 51 24 62.05 73.06 44.66 25.64
51+ to 60- 6 -59.70 -71.81 -254.34 -632.34
60 to 80- 47 67.72¤ 131.46¤¤¤ 169.36¤¤¤ 71.37
80 to 100 19 80.00 18.69 63.95 181.90
Two Public Parents: Noncontaminated Sample
Mean all 550 56.1932¤¤ 45.48¤ 59.84¤ -17.87
(P value) (0:0126) (0:0997) (0:0950) (0:7401)
At least One Public Parent: Full Sample
Mean all 1,475 30.3641¤¤ 36.7665¤¤ 39.1391¤ 0.78
(P value) (0:0263) (0:0284) (0:0720) (0:9809)
Signiﬁcance level:
¤¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 0.1%,
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1%,
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5%,
¤ signiﬁcant at 10%.
Table 8: Model Tests Based on Relative Costs °¤ (k)
Testing our model prediction that parents are less homogeneous in JVs with outright majority control k = A than in
50-50 JVs (k = J), we conduct the following one-sided hypothesis test, for which we wish to reject the null, in terms
of the sample means of b °
¤ (A) and b °
¤ (J):
H0 : °
¤ (A) = °
¤ (J); H1 : °
¤ (A) > °
¤ (J)





the alternative H1 : °
¤ (J) 6=
1
2: The relevant test statistics are asymptotically normally distributed with P values
PrfZ · z jH0g for the test of °
¤ (A) > °





We use the full sample with various outlier corrections for observations with wealth gains close to 0.
Majority Control vs. 50-50 JVs: H0 : °¤ (A) = °¤ (J); H1 : °¤ (A) > °¤ (J)
Sample mean °¤ (J) 0.2803 0.2995 0.2673
Sample mean °¤ (A) 0.6057 0.8164 0.5822
Test statistic z 921.0961 163.4085 685.3361
P value: PrfZ · z jH0g 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Model Prediction Reject H0 in favor of H1
50-50 JVs: H0 : °¤ (J) = 1
2; H1 : °¤ (J) 6= 1
2
Sample mean °¤ (J) 0.2803 0.2995 0.2673
Test statistic z -1.3758 -0.2323 -0.5504
P value: PrfjZj · z jH0g 0.1689 0.8163 0.5821
Model Prediction Fail to Reject H0
Sample selection b °
¤ (k) 2 (0;1) b °
¤ (k) 2 (¡1;5);wi > 0 b °
¤ (k) 2 (¡1;5)
Observations 194 70 258
36Table 9: Determinants of JV Ownership and Control
PrfREGIMEj = kg = Λ
 
¯1kb °





















¤ (k;z)j our parent similarity variable b °
¤ (k), LEVj a binary variable for JV leverage, and RELxxx
l
j measures JV and parent
relatedness (see Figure 6) in terms of SIC codes (SICxxx) or national origin (NATxxx). Our proxies for value diversion are
SICaab and NATaab. We estimate the speciﬁcations by full-information Maximum Likelihood with a grid search over z for
the 50-plus regime, and exclude 8 outliers from our sample so that b °
¤ (k;z) 2 (¡5;5). In the second speciﬁcation, we drop








¯k at the sample means of the regressors and report their P values in parentheses below. Since probabilities
sum to 1, the coeﬃcients of the k = J equation are normalized to 0 to remove the resulting indeterminacy.
Speciﬁcation 1 2
Regime k = J k = P k = A k = J k = P k = A
z 26.41 26.42
b °
¤ (k;z) 1:6842¤¤¤¤ 0:7559¤¤¤ 1:4541¤¤¤¤ 0:7457¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect ¡0:2014¤¤¤¤ 0:0912¤¤¤¤ 0:1101¤¤ ¡0:1949¤¤¤¤ 0:0881¤¤¤¤ 0:1068¤¤
(P value) (0:0004) (0:0001) (0::0275) (0:0003) (0:0002) (0:0212)
LEV ¡1:6514¤¤¤ ¡1:7728¤¤¤¤ ¡2:0471¤¤¤¤ ¡1:7131¤¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:3672¤¤¤¤ ¡0:0736¤¤ ¡0:2936¤¤¤¤ 0:3803¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1126¤¤¤¤ ¡0:2677¤¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0292) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0007) (0:0000)
SICaaa ¡2:5554¤¤¤¤ ¡0:3856
Marg. Eﬀect 0:1803¤¤¤ ¡0:1502¤¤¤¤ ¡0:0300
(P value) (0:0013) (0:0000) (0:5417)
SICaca ¡2:5873¤¤¤¤ ¡0:7264¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2378¤¤¤ ¡0:1469¤¤¤¤ ¡0:0909
(P value) (0:0029) (0:0007) (0:2019)
SICaab ¡2:4761¤¤¤¤ ¡1:1567¤¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:3035¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1335¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1700¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0012)
SICacb ¡2:0402¤¤¤¤ ¡0:6532¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2007¤¤¤ ¡0:1146¤¤¤¤ ¡0:0861
(P value) (0:0015) (0:0002) (0:1290)
NATaaa ¡2:3592¤¤¤¤ ¡0:8475¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2584¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1491¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1092¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0130)
NATaab ¡1:9499¤¤¤¤ ¡0:7880¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2275¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1217¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1057¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0088)
NATbac ¡2:4252¤¤ ¡0:9139
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2724¤ ¡0:1526¤¤ ¡0:1198
(P value) (0:0579) (0:0480) (0:3426)
Log-likelihood -210.52 -216.11
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.117
Log-likelihood Ratio 68.37¤¤¤¤ 57.21¤¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0000)
Observations 289 289
Signiﬁcance level:
¤¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 0.1%,
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1%,
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5%,
¤ signiﬁcant at 10%.
37Table 10: Parent Similarity and Value Diversion
PrfREGIMEj = kg = Λ
 
¯1kb °
¤ (k;z)j + ¯2kb °







where we add to the speciﬁcation in equation (9) the interactive variable b °
¤ (k;z)j ¢SICaabj to test the model prediction that
parents are more heterogeneous under 50-50 ownership when the potential for value extraction is larger. All other variables
remain unchanged, as do the sample selection and estimation procedures (see Table 9 for further explanations).
Speciﬁcation 1 2
Regime k = J k = P k = A k = J k = P k = A
z 26:41 26:42
b °
¤ (k;z) 2:5677¤¤¤¤ 1:1334¤¤¤ 1:9373¤¤¤¤ 1:2167¤¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect ¡0:2987¤¤¤¤ 0:1311¤¤¤¤ 0:1676¤¤ ¡0:2940¤¤¤¤ 0:1123¤¤¤¤ 0:1817¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0003) (0:0002) (0:0193) (0:0001) (0:0003) (0:0034)
b °
¤ (k;z) ¢ SICaab ¡1:5415¤¤ ¡0:7253 ¡0:8433¤ ¡0:9207¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:1868¤ ¡0:0780¤¤ ¡0:1087 0:1903¤¤ ¡0:0422 ¡0:1480¤
(P value) (0:0873) (0:0479) (0::2695) (0:0332) (0:1840) (0:0597)
LEV ¡1:6353¤¤¤ ¡1:8067¤¤¤¤ ¡2:1128¤¤¤¤ ¡1:7713¤¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:3706¤¤¤¤ ¡0:0678¤¤ ¡0:3028¤¤¤¤ 0:3915¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1149¤¤¤¤ ¡0:2765¤¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0353) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0005) (0:0000)
SICaaa ¡3:0278¤¤¤¤ ¡0:4619
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2069¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1673¤¤¤¤ ¡0:0395
(P value) (0:0004) (0:0000) (0:4441)
SICaca ¡3:1357¤¤¤¤ ¡0:8890¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2825¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1673¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1152
(P value) (0:0009) (0:0002) (0:1277)
SICaab ¡2:0084¤¤¤¤ ¡01:021¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2560¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1006¤¤¤ ¡0:1554¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0011) (0:0060)
SICacb ¡2:6253¤¤¤¤ ¡0:7979¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2454¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1393¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1061¤
(P value) (0:0003) (0:0001) (0:0829)
NATaaa ¡2:4580¤¤¤¤ ¡0:9333¤¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2758¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1528¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1229¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0055)
NATaab ¡1:9925¤¤¤¤ ¡0:8044¤¤¤
Marg. Eﬀect 0:2311¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1231¤¤¤¤ ¡0:1080¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0079)
NATbac ¡2:6824¤¤ ¡1:1328
Marg. Eﬀect 0:3192¤¤ ¡0:1648¤¤ ¡0:1543
(P value) (0:0312) (0:0348) (0:2316)
Log-likelihood ¡208:07 ¡213:73
Pseudo R2 0:15 0:127
Log-likelihood Ratio 73:29¤¤¤¤ 61:95¤¤¤¤
(P value) (0:0000) (0:0000)
Observations 289 289
Signiﬁcance level:
¤¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 0.1%,
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1%,
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5%,
¤ signiﬁcant at 10%.
38Table 11: Return Performance of Contingent Ownership
This table reports the mean abnormal and mean cumulative abnormal returns for joint ventures with explicit
buyout options. Since our US sample contains only 36 such datapoints, we replicate the analysis for a
worldwide sample of 187 joint ventures with buyout provisions, including the 36 American ones.



















¤¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 0.1%,
¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1%,
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 5%,
¤ signiﬁcant at 10%.
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